A tale of three nations ?: The role of United Nations peacekeepers and missions on
the concept of nation-state, nationalism, and ownership of the state in Lebanon, the
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Part I
The concept of nationalism of ideology and shared values has existed since
Biblical times,1 and has only become more prominent in societal structure in the centuries
which have followed . Many attempts to define what is and is not nationalism have been
made throughout history,2 yet despite these attempts there is no perfect formula for what
gives rise to nationalism or what makes a nation-state and how to create it. However, at
its core a nation is made of people, and all nations, regardless of organization, ideology,
or ethnicity, turn to law to control – if not shape – their societies. This duality of basic
composition is perhaps best illustrated by the Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of
“nation”3 and “state.”4 According to these definitions, a “nation” is “[a] large group of
people having a common origin, language, and tradition and usually constituting a
political entity,”5 while a “state” is “[t]he political system of a body of people who are
politically organized; the system of rules by which jurisdiction and authority are
exercised over such a body of people.”6 From this emerges the unity of people and law
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which forms the fundamental core of the global concept of a nation-state,, regardless of
where one believes the concept itself originated.
With the advent of the United Nations (U. N.) in the aftermath of World War II,
nations and nationalism became framed in the concept of “self-determination.”7 This
concept - originally meant to refer only to allowing areas under colonial control to
determine whether they would remain under colonial control or forge their own states8 has taken on a life of its own and has been used in the international law realm to support
the idea of breaking up states and providing support - especially from the United Nations
- for splinter groups wishing to form their own states, regardless of whether these groups
were part of the colonial apparatus that the United Nations’ charter was intended to
eradicate.9
The U. N. Charter also charges the members of the Security Council with
maintaining international “peace and security.”10 From its initial conception as a means to
stop interstate conflicts,11 the “peace and security” preservation strand of the U. N.
Charter has been used in conjunction with the military portions of the Charter to justify
the creation and deployment of United Nations peacekeepers to areas of intrastate and
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intra-society conflict as well.12 From keepers of peace and protectors of innocent
populations, U. N. peacekeeping missions have come to encompass multi-faceted
operations which attempt not only to protect human innocents, but also to create a legal
and governmental structure for the affected areas.13 Many of the legal systems which the
U. N. attempts to impose in the areas where peacekeepers are deployed involve creating a
constitution which, at least in name, guarantees that all peoples in an affected area are
represented in various governmental and political bodies.14
This article will address the issue of whether U. N. peacekeeping missions and
their attendant attempts to restructure the laws and governments of the affected areas
actually promote the creation of a healthy and viable nation-state. By examining three
United Nations missions – the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),15 the
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNMONUC) in the
Democratic Republic of Congo,16and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)17
– this article will examine several cases to see whether these peacekeeping missions do in
fact lead to viable nation-states. The areas to be examined are the physical stability of the
area and the ability of the peacekeepers and missions to prevent and respond to
violence18; the stated goals and activities of the peacekeepers and the missions for the
affected areas;19 and the constitutional and/or governing documents which the missions
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have either promulgated or are in the process of attempting to promulgate for the affected
areas.20
Part II of this article addresses Lebanon and UNIFIL.21 Part II opens with a brief
discussion of the previous role of the U. N. in Lebanon,22 as well as a short background
review of both the past and current state of Lebanese politics, law, and society.23
Discussion then moves to the UNIFIL mission itself, which was started in1978 as an
“interim” mission, yet continues to exist through the present day and indeed has been
extended through 2006.24 Finally, Part II concludes with analysis of the overall impact
which UNIFIL has had on Lebanese law and society.25
Part III addresses the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UNMONUC
. 26 As
the Congo was also the site of an earlier U. N. peacekeeping mission (indeed, this was in
many ways the first official site of a peacekeeping mission under the auspices of the U.N.
peacekeeping force as it is currently envisioned 27), Part III will open with a short history
of the previous U. N. peacekeeping presence in the Congo.28 Discussion will then turn to
the history of the current conflict in the Congo.29 This in turn leads to a discussion of
UNMONUC.30 Part III will conclude with analysis of the impact of UNMONUC on the
stability of the Congo, as well as on the state of law and society in the Congo.31
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Part IV addresses Kosovo and UNMIK – and, by extension, Serbia and
Montenegro.32 A brief history of the Kosovo conflict opens Part IV, accompanied by a
discussion of the current state of law, government and society in Serbia and
Montenegro.33 An examination of UNMIK follows, with close attention paid to both the
escalation in violent incidents in Kosovo over recent months while UNMIK has been
present in Kosovo,34 and to the draft constitution which UNMIK is attempting to have
Kosovars adopt (over the objections of such U. N. Security Council members as the
United States35).36 The conclusion of Part IV is a two-pronged analysis of the impact of
UNMIK on Kosovar law and society,37 as well as a comparison of the freedoms and
rights offered to Kosovars under both the UNMIK draft constitution and the current
constitution of Serbia and Montenegro.38
In conclusion, Part V ties together observations and analysis from the prior parts
and draws conclusions as to the role which U. N. peacekeeper missions play in the
creation of viable nation-states for the future.39 The ultimate conclusion of this article is
that, whatever the intentions behind peacekeeping missions might be, the structure and
assigned functions of the U. N. peacekeeping missions discussed at best do not assist in
the building of a cohesive legal or societal structure in the affected areas to which they
are deployed,40 and at worst actually serve to cripple the creation of a viable nation-state
by insinuating themselves, their goals and norms into the new legal structures of the
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affected areas.41 In so doing, these missions do not create legal systems which reflect
shared societal values and norms, but rather insert an international bureaucratic
understanding of what a nation-state “should” think and do.42 This, it is argued, is the
exact opposite of the U. N. Charter’s requirement of self-determination and subsumes the
will of the local population to the will of the U. N. bureaucracy.43 As a corollary, the
undermining of the nation-state concept which forms the backbone of the U. N. also
undermines the U. N. Charter’s charge to the Security Council that it promote
international “peace and security.”44
Part II – Lebanon and UNIFIL
A. Missions past – UNOGIL
Although the UNIFIL mission has been in existence in Lebanon for 27years,45 it
was not the first experience U.N. peacekeepers had with Lebanon. The first U.N.
peacekeepers arrived in Lebanon in 195846 for an operation termed UNOGIL (U.N.
Observation Group in Lebanon).47 The presence of U.N. peacekeepers under the auspices
of UNOGIL was at the request of the Lebanese government.48 At the time, Lebanon
domestically was involved in a power struggle between several internal political
factions49 (with primary divisions made across religious lines, which is the norm in
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Lebanon, as Lebanese law,50 politics,51 and society52 are divided along confessional
lines), and requested the U.N.’s intervention because of the increasing role which Syria
was playing in giving support to some of the various factions involved in theconflict .53
Although UNOGIL was created to monitor the Syrian role in the Lebanese conflict,54
subsequent events in the greater Middle East led to a tenuous position for the Lebanese
and UNOGIL,55 which was not allowed to use force in its mandate.56 Ultimately, the
Lebanese government turned to the militaries of the United States and the United
Kingdom to provide protection to Lebanese people and allow UNOGIL to continue with
its observations.57
The UNOGIL mission did not extend past 1958, with the mission ending in
December, 1958.58 Despite UNOGIL’s presence, and purported ability to monitor the inflow of ammunition and other resources to Lebanon, Syrian presence and control in
Lebanon would not end with the UNOGIL mission.59 Indeed, despite the intervention of
UNOGIL, Lebanon enjoyed only a brief period of stability in the aftermath of the

LEBANON]; LEBANON FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005) [hereinafter LEBANON FACTBOOK].
50
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mission’s termination before being plunged into a vicious and long-term civil war,60 as
discussed below. It should also be noted that this mission did not interfere in domestic
Lebanese politics or life, but rather was aimed at controlling the Syrian dimension of
Lebanese foreign relations; thus, UNOGIL was closer to the idea of stopping interstate
conflict which was the original premise behind the promotion of “international peace and
security” in the U.N. Charter used to justify the creation and existence of U.N.
peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions.
B. Background
As mentioned above, Lebanon is a country which is legally, politically, and
societally fragmented across confessional lines; this has been the historical trend in
modern Lebanon. The primary Christian groups in Lebanon are the Maronites,61 and the
Greek Orthodox,62 with other groups such as other Uniate Churches,63 Roman
Catholics,64 and Protestants65 also comprising Christian communities in Lebanon. At the
time of Lebanon’s independence, the majority Muslim group were the Sunnis,66 however
with immigration to Lebanon from other surrounding countries, and in the aftermath of
the Lebanese civil war, it is estimated that Shi’is are or will be the majority sect in the
near future.67
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Although the Lebanese constitution decries confessionalism,68 especially in the
political realm,69 and guarantees the same rights and freedoms to Lebanese of all
beliefs,70 the country is still governed by sectarian cleavages. Under the terms of the
National Pact, an unwritten agreement entered into by the ruling confessional groups in
1958,71 the position of President of the Lebanese Republic will be held by a Maronite,72
the position of Lebanese Prime Minister will be held by a Sunni,73 and the position of
President of the Lebanese Parliament will be held by a Shi’ia.74 Voters in Lebanese
elections are registered by religious affiliation,75 and seats in the Lebanese Parliament are
apportioned among confessional parties.76 In more personal terms, laws relating to
personal status (typically laws having to do with marriage, divorce, family law, and
inheritance77) are promulgated and administered by each sect according to its own
councils and religious courts.78
As the result of many factors which are outside the scope of this article, civil war
erupted in Lebanon along confessional lines in 1975 and continued until the 1990 Ta’if
Accords.79 This war, which saw intra-confessional fighting,80 as well as inter-
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confessional strife,81 not only engulfed Lebanon, but also attracted such actors as Syria,
Israel, and the U.N., especially when the conflict started to create instability in the
Lebanon-Israel border region where many Palestinian refugee camps were located.82
C. UNIFIL - mandate and reality
UNIFIL was given life on March 19, 1978 through U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 425 and 426.83 These resolutions were passed as the result of Israeli
incursions into Lebanon during the civil war,84 and, in pertinent part, authorized U.N.
action to stop the Israeli incursions85; this action was placed under the direction of the
Secretary General.86
The first UNIFIL members arrived in the weeks immediately following the
promulgation and adoption of Resolutions 425 and 426,87 while diplomats were still
trying to figure out the acceptability of UNIFIL in the area.88 At this time, concerns were
raised as to what UNIFIL would actually do for and to Lebanon and its territorial
integrity.89 Into the mix of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,90 the Lebanon-Israeli conflict,91
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the Lebanese civil war,92 and the complex triangular relationship between Syria,
Lebanon, and Israel,93 the U.N. was placing peacekeepers at the mercy of the PLO, Israeli
forces, and other groups operating in the area, with very little recourse for themselves or
the population living in the UNIFIL area.94
From 1978 to the present, UNIFIL has been a constant presence on the LebanonIsrael border,95 yet has been unable to impact the Lebanese-Israeli land dispute beyond
monitoring and reporting incidents to higher-ups in each government and the U.N.
structure,96 and providing some forms of humanitarian aide to those living near the
UNIFIL camp (which, while certainly admirable from a humanitarian point of view, is
legally in violation of Resolutions 425 and 426, as these only authorize the interim force
to be present for Israeli withdrawal from the area97).98 Lebanon and Israel have gone back
and forth over control of the border in the UNIFIL area, and the progress made in
removing the Israelis from the contested area was attributable more to other events in the
region than to the presence and action of UNIFIL.99
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In terms of exercising its peacekeeping function, it can be argued that UNIFIL is
hardly a success. Not only has it been unable to effectively mediate the land dispute
situation it was sent in to control, it cannot legitimately function in the area without the
guaranteed protection (or at least guarantee of freedom from harassment) by such local
groups as Hizbollah.100 From the start of the UNIFIL mission through the most recently
released reports by the UNIFIL officers to the Secretary General and the Security Council
there are recurrent trends which indicate the weakness of the UNIFIL mission.101 This
weakness stems not only from the political and day-to-day situation in which UNIFIL
operates, but also the failure of the U.N. itself to properly equip UNIFIL members and
create a cohesive operating unit.102
If the purpose of a peacekeeping force and mission is, at its heart, to protect
international peace and security through protecting the local populations involved in
conflict and stopping the escalation of violence in the affected area, then UNIFIL
represents a failure of peacekeeping. Rather than forcing an Israeli withdrawal from the
area of southern Lebanon under UNIFIL’s control, UNIFIL sat by and was unable to do
anything to stop the Israelis from further incursions into Lebanese sovereign territory in
1982.103 Even after the Israeli pull-back from a portion of the southern Lebanese border
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area in 2000,104 UNIFIL was still unable to stop the basic fighting between Israelis,
Palestinians, and Lebanese, and, according to UNIFIL’s own documents, could do little
more than act as a tattle-tale for observed bad acts on either side,105 while becoming a
targets itself106 and finding itself unable to guarantee the safety of its personnel,
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buildings, and equipment or the safety of the local populations.107 Indeed, perhaps the
most involvement UNIFIL is alleged to have had in intervening in the Israeli-Lebanese
conflict situation came in a 2000 incident in which UNIFIL forces were accused by the
Israelis of secreting away videotape containing information on a group of Hizbollah
members who kidnapped several Israeli soldiers.108
Despite these failures, the Lebanese government repeatedly asks for, and the U.N.
Security Council repeatedly grants, extensions of the UNIFIL mission; the most recent
extension provides for UNIFIL operations to continue through at least 2006.109
Interestingly, at a time when the Lebanese government and people are in the middle of a
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debate over the future of the country’s ties with Hizbollah110 and Syria (a frequent source
of Hizbollah funding111), UNIFIL’s extension means that the Lebanese government itself
can put off a confrontation with Hizbollah in the southern Lebanon region where UNIFIL
now operates. UNIFIL presence in this area can also be seen as retarding the concept of
ownership over southern Lebanon by the Lebanese as a whole, as the area is not fully
under the control of Lebanese military or police,112 and it can be argued that the
continued presence of UNIFIL indicates to residents of the area, and by extension to the
Lebanese in general that there is no settled incorporation of the area into sovereign
Lebanese territory.
D. Analysis and conclusions
The above account of the UNIFIL mission paints a dismal picture for those
peacekeepers and mission officials deployed to UNIFIL, as they face personal and
professional threats, and are essentially operating at the mercy of the armed factions and
other groups operating in the border area.113 It also casts aspersions on whether UNIFIL
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is operating on firm legal ground in light of the narrow language of its original mandate
and the wide-ranging activities it currently engages in.114
Whatever the dismal nature of the UNIFIL mission for its staff members, it is
even more dismal for the concept of nationalism and the nation-state in Lebanon, as well
as the concept of ownership of the area by the Lebanese government and people. UNIFIL
operated in the contested border area for all but the first three years of the Lebanese civil
war, but was unable to do anything to stop the war or stop Israeli incursions into the civil
war itself. UNIFIL was unable to stop the PLO from operating in the area, and when the
PLO relocated, UNIFIL could not stop Hizbollah and other equally terroristic and
disruptive groups from filling the void left by the PLO.115 Similarly, even after the end of
the Lebanese civil war, UNIFIL has been unable to stop Israeli forces from intruding on
the area. All of this leads to a status-quo situation, where no real progress towards
integrating the border area into Lebanon, on a map or in the psyche, can be made.
At the same time, the rest of Lebanon is at a precipice point for sovereignty and
self-ownership of nation, as illustrated by the after-effects of the assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister - and increasingly vocal anti-Syrian advocate - Rafik Hariri on
February 14, 2005, allegedly at the hands of Syrian-allied forces.116 In the days following
Hariri’s death, the country came together and average Lebanese from a variety of
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religious sects began demanding a pullout of Syrian troops and intelligence agents in
Lebanon.117 While this unity has not resulted in an overthrow of the standard confessional
divides in Lebanese society, or changed any laws relating to societal status, it has
demonstrated that the Lebanese Republic, as a constitutional government with viable
rights and freedoms, is something with which many people associate themselves and feel
a sense of responsibility and ownership for.
UNIFIL becomes problematic in light of the Hariri episode because it perpetuates
the idea of a fragmented Lebanon needing the protection of outside parties (however
inadequate this protection might be) to survive. Legally, the framework for a viable
Lebanon exists in the form of a constitution and series of statutory laws which were
created by the Lebanese themselves and which, at least in the constitutional case, were
able to withstand even civil war.118 The Hariri demonstrations and the Syrian retreat
which followed are signals that the “nation” part of the “nation” and “state” duality
discussed in Part I is becoming a more concrete reality in Lebanon, since the Lebanese
were rallying for Syrian removal as Lebanese, not as Maronites, Sunnis, or any other
confessional or self-identifying group.119 With the “state” apparatus entrenched in
Lebanese law, politics, and society, and the “nation” idea constantly emerging, the
UNIFIL presence can only serve to harm the creation of a viable Lebanese nation-state by
undermining the sense of communality of all Lebanese territory under the same laws and
117
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by the same people. UNIFIL also provides a staging ground for Hizbollah and other
terror groups to infiltrate Lebanon further, thereby continuing to threaten the cohesion of
the Lebanese state and identity. There may indeed be some problems with the state, and
the cohesion of national identity might need to be strengthened, but the ultimate purpose
of self-determination has been met in Lebanon, and international peace and security can
only be undermined by maintaining a divisive U.N. peacekeeping force and mission
there.
Part III – the Democratic Republic of Congo
A. Missions Past - UNONUC
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Congo), formerly known as the
Belgian Congo,120 has the distinction of being the site of the U.N. peacekeeping operation
which launched the peacekeeping mechanism that has evolved into the current U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.121 From the outset, the conflict in the Congo
was both international – in thatother nations, particularly Belgium, were directly
involved in the conflict122 – and an intranational civil war, in which various factions
started a civil war within days of the country’s 1960 grant of independence.123 In this
sense, the first U.N. peacekeeping deployment in the Congo (named United Nations
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Operation in the Congo, or UNONUC124) was a test not only for the Congo as a nation
and the peacekeepers sent to protect it, but also to the idea of self-determination which
forms the backbone of the U.N. itself and the U. N. Charter.125 Due to the international
aspects of the conflict, intervention in the Congo was also viewed as an extension of the
preservation of “international peace and security” called for in the U.N. Charter.126
UNONUC forces were assisted in their efforts by the diplomatic efforts of the thenSecretary General Dag Hammarskjöld himself127; indeed Hammarskjöld’s death was
caused by an aircraft accident which occurred while he was in the area to assist with the
peace process.128
The 1960 conflict in the Congo was in essence a conflict for the fledgling nationstate and its ownership. The initial throes of the Congolese independence movement
featured economic hardship and societal differences which emerged in the face of
independence.129 In the years leading up to full-fledged Congolese independence, the idea
of independence and the type of state which the Congo would be in the future emerged in
a variety of political parties, each represented by its own leaders and with its own
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concepts of what the new nation should be.130 Despite the well-intentioned rhetoric of
self-determination, in the early Congolese case independence and free elections bred
violence and provincial fighting which ignited into the civil war and occasioned the
arrival of U.N. peacekeeping forces131 on the heels of an attempt by Belgium to re-deploy
its troops to the area.132
As the Congolese civil war progressed it began to involve the U.N. in general, and
the UNONUC forces in particular, in its power contest,133 until finally the Security
Council refined UNONUC’s mandate in the Congo to reflect the reality of the political
and legal situation on the ground rather than in a conference room.134 Even then, the
diplomatic and day-to-day ground conditions in the Congo were extremely volatile and
unpredictable for diplomats, officials, and peacekeepers alike.135 Indeed, after four years
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in the Congo UNONUC officials and peacekeepers were still faced with fresh outbreaks
of fighting and violence in new areas of the country.136
One of the reasons for the continued conflict in the Congo was the abrogation of
the Congolese constitution,137 which initially occurred in 1960, and continued to be an
issue throughout the course of the conflict.138 Although the conflict in the Congo was
ultimately calmed under the Mobutu regime,139 and UNONUC forces left the Congo by
the end of 1964,140 the first Congolese civil war conflict rent a hole in the fabric of
constitutionalism in the new nation.141 Tellingly, the UNONUC mission had also created
tension at the U.N. as to the constitutionality of peacekeeping activities such as
UNONUC under the terms of the U.N. Charter142; these tensions would later be resolved
in favor of increased U. N. peacekeeping activity.143
B. Post – UNONUC Background
While the Mobutu regime in the Congo arguably did not bring societal openness
or an environment conducive to the enjoyment of constitutional rights and freedoms,144 it
did bring a semblance of stability to the country until the mid-1990s.145 However, the
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political climate in neighboring states was not as tightly controlled as Mobutu’s Congo,
and by the mid-1990s ethnic fighting in Rwanda had started to spill over into the Congo,
at least in terms of sending combatants across the border.146 The internal state of law and
order in the Congo began to deteriorate at the same time,147 and in 1999 Mobutu was
removed from power in a coup; he was then succeeded by Laurent Kabila.148
C. UNMONUC – mandate and mission
In the wake of the Kabila coup and the rising instability in the Congo, the U.N.
Security Council created the UNMONUC force for the Congo,149 initially as an observer
mission only.150 However, the situation in the Congo did not stabilize, and by 2001 the
U.N. Security Council authorized an increase in UNMONUC military personnel.151
Unlike the UNONUC forces, which were deployed to try to keep the peace in a
nascent country, the UNMONUC forces were sent in to stabilize the region, yet to date
have failed to do so. UNMONUC forces have not stopped the Congolese fighting after
six years of deployment, and indeed stories of atrocities against the Congolese peoples
and other refugee populations which UNMONUC are charged with protecting emerge
from the area on a regular basis.152 UNMONUC forces themselves are also targets of
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various warring factions, in a similar fashion to UNIFIL forces in Lebanon, and
UNMONUC peacekeepers have been targeted, killed, and injured by these factions since
their arrival in the Congo.153
In light of the humanitarian charge given to UNMONUC under its mandate, an
account of UNMONUC activities is not complete without a mention of the hideous and
frequent allegations, largely substantiated, of sexual abuse by UNMONUC forces against
the very women and children they are in the Congo to protect.154 The U.N. response to
this – greater peacekeeper education about safe sex with host populations and a further
study of the allegations – seems not only grossly out-of-proportion to the gravity of the
situation,155 but also belies the essential question at the heart of these abuses – whether
peace and security are being advanced by allowing UNMONUC forces to rape, spread
HIV and other diseases, and father children without impunity.156
Turning to law and politics in the Congo, UNMONUC has similarly been unable
to keep the peace or foster a settlement to the hostilities. There is a functioning
government of the Congo,157 which is an extension of the Kabila regime under the
leadership of Laurent Kabila’s son,158 Joseph, who assumed control after his father’s
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death.159 Early attempts at cease-fires and draft settlements which were brokered by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the U.N. failed miserably.160 At present, there
is a draft Congolese constitution which is scheduled to be sent to the voters for
referendum approval at some point in 2006161; this, and the election of several vicepresidents and ministers to a temporary government of an unspecified duration,162 are the
only concrete and seemingly long-lasting steps towards legal and political stability which
have been achieved during the time of UNMONUC’s mission in the Congo.
D. Analysis
Unlike the UNIFIL mission, which has jurisdiction limited to a particular area
within an already established state, UNMONUC operates in what is best described as the
remnants of a state. The Mobutu regime held the shattered state which emerged from the
first Congolese civil war together through standard dictatorial practices of highly
concentrated control and by ignoring constitutional imperatives163; it did not foster legal
or political avenues for citizens to take ownership of the state. The regime repressed
political movements which ran counter to its own stances, positions and views,164 but it
could not control the inner workings of neighboring countries, and was similarly unable
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to stop the flow of unrest from these neighbors across the borders of the Congo.165 By the
time UNMONUC was authorized and deployed a very legitimate question existed (and
still exists) – whether there was actually any peace to keep.
Once deployed to the Congo, UNMONUC was similarly unable to bring an end to
the conflicts raging inside the country. UNMONUC’s mission mandate calls for
peacekeepers to do several things while in the Congo,166 but the use of force is not one of
them except in a few rare instances167; hence, UNMONUC forces have become targets in
the conflict.168 Due to their weak status vis a vis the use of force, UNMONUC forces
have also been unable to protect the population of the Congo from warring factions.
Indeed, UNMONUC has been unable to protect these populations even from themselves.
Legally, the UNMONUC mission has proved no more successful. With
UNMONUC forces unable to control the fighting, early attempts at peace and cease-fire
were scuttled.169 Currently, a draft constitution exists and, if enacted, this draft
constitution purports to guarantee Congolese citizens many rights and privileges.170
However, this draft constitution contains several provisions which are problematic and
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call into question whether the state to be governed by this constitution actually exists or is
a constructed fiction.171
The explanatory note to the draft constitution explains that “[s]ince its
independence. . . the Democratic Republic of Congo has been confronted by recurrent
political crises, one of the fundamental causes of which has been the contestation of its
institutions and actors.”172 The preamble to the draft constitution states “We, the
Congolese people, united by destiny and a history of noble ideas of liberty, fraternity,
solidarity, justice, peace, and work. . . . Reaffirm our inalienable and unprescribable right
for us to organize freely and develop our political, economic, social and cultural lives.”173
The first title of the explanatory note of the draft constitution, “The State and Its
Sovereignty,”174 provides that “the present constitution reaffirms democratic principles
which emanate from the people as the source of primary sovereignty.”175 However,
Article 51 of the constitution provides “[t]he State has the task of assuring and promoting
the peaceful and harmonious coexistence of all ethnic groups in the country. The State
assures equal protection and promotion of vulnerable groups and all minorities in the
State.”176 Further, Article 66 charges the Congolese people themselves with the task of
stopping discrimination.177
On their face, these constitutional provisions are lofty goals and pleasant sound
bites. However, a look at what these provisions mean when taken together paints a far
less pleasing picture. Admitting that there have been difficulties with sovereignty and
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peace in the Congo is certainly a historical truism, however this admission also
undermines the idea that the draft constitution has been created for a viable state which
can go forward and govern itself peaceably. Admitting difficulties with sovereignty and
peace since Congolese independence while at the same time constructing a questionable
basis of beliefs which all Congolese as a people are assumed to hold and are entitled to is
both incongruous and leads to an unbalanced legal construct and societal sense of the
guiding history of the Congo. By charging the state with monitoring and overseeing the
equal protection of minorities and other groups which have been victims of
discrimination or worse in the past, the draft constitution legalizes the concept that the
Congolese people as a whole are still divided and cannot function as a society without the
intervention of the government to stop fighting. Conversely, by charging the people with
the legal duty of stopping discrimination, the draft constitution also enshrines the idea
that the federal government created in the draft constitution must have help in protecting
its citizens and is not legally powerful or societally respected enough to control its
population.
Certainly the UNMONUC forces did not write the draft constitution provisions
and are not responsible for these glaring problems which will likely prevent the full
realization of a viable Congolese nation-state owned by all Congolese if the draft
constitution is ultimately adopted. However, UNMONUC is responsible for the draft
constitution because by its very presence and premise, UNMONUC insinuates that there
is a single Congolese state to preserve and keep peaceful. Self-determination as a concept
was meant to free people from colonization, however there is no legal or practical basis to
support the idea that self-determination as an espoused right stopped when European
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nations left. If the U.N.’s true goal is to provide the people of the world with the right to
self-determination, and the ability to access this right, then it must also realize that selfdetermination can come in the form of neighbors electing to fight and secede from their
neighbors even if the state being deconstructed by such secession was a U.N.-based
construct in the past. Years of peacekeeping operations have amply illustrated that, when
there is no peace to keep, peacekeeping becomes futile and impedes progress towards an
ultimate solution to the conflict.
The case of UNMONUC and the current attempts at governing the Congo also
indicate that peacekeeping missions can undermine international peace and security.
Peacekeepers becoming victims of the conflict cannot protect domestic or international
peace and security, and peacekeepers who become predators do nothing but harm to the
concept of international peace and security. Turning to law, peacekeepers, and their
missions, deployed to areas fraught with ethnic and affiliational conflicts - which are so
deep-seated that they have existed at least since independence and are subject to
constitutional attempts to keep in check – undermine the laws of the U.N. Charter which
they are charged with upholding and leave open the possibility that international peace
and security will be continually undermined in the aftermath of the installation of a new
governmental apparatus which seeks to put a legal gloss over decades of conflict without
solving the underlying reasons behind it.
Part IV – Kosovo
A. History and Background
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Currently, Kosovo is part of the internationally recognized territory of Serbia and
Montenegro.178 Formerly part of Yugoslavia, Kosovo began to experience internal
conflicts at the end of the 1990s,179 when the states comprising Yugoslavia were in the
process of dividing up the doomed Yugoslav state into smaller nations.180 During this
process, the Serbs engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing and atrocities against the
largely-Albanian population in the Kosovo province of Serbia.181 In the face of these acts,
and on the heels of the very public atrocities committed upon various ethnic groups in
neighboring Bosnia,182 the international community began to react to the Kosovo
violence, first through NATO and then through the U.N.183
The political situation in Serbia and Montenegro stabilized after the 2000 regime
change which saw the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic,184 and currently is under the legal
safeguards of a valid and binding constitution.185 This constitution proclaims itself as the
constitution of all Serbia and Montenegro and contemplates that the Kosovo province is
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still part of the sovereign territory of Serbia and Montenegro , albeit under the protection
of outside actors.186
The constitution of Serbia and Montenegro creates a uniform seal and flag for the
country, uniting all groups under this banner.187 This constitution guarantees citizens of
each constituent state/province the same rights and privileges as those in other constituent
states/provinces enjoy.188 The constitution also attempts to create equality and parity
between member states at the ministerial level by requiring that certain key ministries be
split between members from different states.189 Under the judiciary provisions of the
constitution, alljudicialhearings on constitutional questions having to do with the
interpretation of the federal constitution must also be attended by state justices who are to
have input on the constitutional question at hand.190 A state in Serbia and Montenegro
retains the right to secede from the federal constitution through certain referenda
mechanisms.191 Additionally, the constitution of Serbia and Montenegro has an
amendment, the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties which
guarantees rights and freedoms to all ethnicities, religions, and member state
populations.192 Among the many provisions of this Charter is an article specifically
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enumerating special rights of minority groups,193 and an article which exhorts member
states to enact legislation and social programs geared towards raising the standard of
living of minority groups in the state.194
B. UNMIK
The United Nations authorized a peacekeeping mission (United Nations Mission
in Kosovo or UNMIK) for Kosovo in 1999.195 UNMIK was on the ground in Kosovo
soon after its mandate, sharing some of its responsibilities with NATO forces which were
already in the area.196
Under the terms of its mandate, UNMIK was not only supposed to stop the ethnic
and other violence occurring in Kosovo, it was also to “perform basic civilian
administration functions; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and selfgovernment in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status;
coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; support the
reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights;
193
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and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their
homes in Kosovo.”197 Regardless of whether one views this mandate as within or without
the scope of the U.N. Charter,198 these goals were easier promulgated than achieved.
In the six years since the creation and deployment of UNMIK, the mission has not
met its goals. Administration of justice is in and of itself a struggle over which ethnic
group’s law to apply and how to apply it.199 There are increasing reports of civilian-oncivilian violence based on ethnic differences despite the presence of UNMIK forces.200
And, most importantly, governmental creation is at a standstill.201
The closest UNMIK has come to sponsoring an independent government for
Kosovo is the 2001 Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government,202 which
has not been officially adopted,203 and does not enjoy U.S. support.204 Under the terms of
the Constitutional Framework, much of the governing of Kosovo would be done by
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UNMIK and its leadership directly and for an indefinite period of time.205 The
Constitutional Framework subdivides the residents of Kosovo into ethnic and/or religious
groups and subgroups, and purporting to give each of these groups their own set of
guaranteed rights and freedoms.206 This division is carried through to elections, which,
under the Constitutional Framework, would be administered by apportioning the allotted
Parliamentary seats by groups in order to make sure that ethnic and religious segments of
the population are present in the parliamentary government.207
C. Analysis
UNMIK’s mandate is arguably not a peacekeeping mandate at all, but rather a
state-building mandate208; in this sense, it undermines the legal and ethical premise of
self-determination, and, in so doing, undermines the basic U.N. tenet of international
peace and security.
Legally, there is no basis for the independence of Kosovo outside of the U.N.
expressing its view that, in the face of ethnic cleansing carried out against Kosovars by
some Serbians, Kosovo should be its own state.209 Before the creation of Yugoslavia after
World War I, the Kosovo area was part of other empires and not its own sovereign
entity.210 Indeed, Milosevic’s reign of terror against Kosovars was not motivated by an
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attempt to stop Kosovar independence211; rather, it was an attempt to cleanse Serbia of
groups other than Serbs.212 It was only in reaction to this cleansing attempt that Kosovar
independence groups began to emerge.213
Of the three case studies presented in this article, Kosovo offers the most puzzling
example of U.N. peacekeeping presence as a catalyst to create a nation where there
otherwise might not be one. Examining the Constitutional Framework, the lack of a
unified people to make up a “nation” and the lack of any semblance of a legal or
governmental apparatus to make up a “state” is glaringly obvious. The Constitutional
Framework acknowledges that there is no homogenous Kosovar population,214 and
fosters the already existing divides among those living in Kosovo by allowing any and
every group present in the Kosovo province to avail itself of rights which are designed to
create differences rather than celebrate the diverse beliefs found in a unified society, or
create a unified society at all. If neighbors are guaranteed the right to celebrate their
differences in the constitution but are not also bound under the same description as
“Kosovars” (or any other nationality), there is no shared sense of Kosovar identity which
can support the imposition of laws and governmental apparatuses on individuals. Rather,
neighbors will view each other by their subgroups, and depend on their ethnic or religious
leaders for legitimatization of law and government, thus depriving citizens of owning
their nation.
The role of UNMIK under the Constitutional Framework is a complete abrogation
of any form of self-government by the Kosovars. The concept of self-determination is
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just that – the determination of a people to live together as a nation with shared laws,
values, and government.215 Self-determination does not include any role, no matter how
short-lived, for a non-military occupying force to act as the source of legal and
governmental primacy in the affected area. By creating a legally binding government
apparatus which usurps local control, UNMIK and its officers have drafted a document
which takes the “state” concept away from Kosovars for an indeterminate period of time
and inserts itself and other U.N. bodies as quasi-governmental organizations.216 There are
no checks on the powers used by these quasi-governmental bodies, the Kosovars are not
given the right to request that these bodies leave or cease their activities, and the most
that the people of Kosovo are guaranteed is that there will be some nascent form of
Parliament created, although even this body is accountable to UNMIK’s leadership.217
Certainly, nothing can erase the horrors of Serbian acts of violence against
Kosovars; however, examining the UNMIK construct of a state for Kosovo, one wonders
whether more injustice will be done to Kosovars if they stay part of Serbia and
Montenegro or if they succumb to the Constitutional Framework proposed by UNMIK.
With constitutional guarantees of civil rights and freedoms forming the backbone of the
new constitution of Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovars, should they opt to remain part of
Serbia and Montenegro, would at least have the opportunity to have their voices heard in
a national setting and be citizens of a larger state which protects their rights and is
accountable to the people who comprise it. Even if Kosovo as a province were ultimately
215
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to secede from Serbia and Montenegro, as it could do under the constitutional provisions
existing in Serbia and Montenegro, it would be seceding as a state to presumably form its
own state. This would be vastly preferable to surrendering its freedoms to a
Constitutional Framework created and administered by UNMIK actors who are
unaccountable to the Kosovars and who cannot create either the “nation” or the “state” in
Kosovo.
Part V – Conclusion
Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kosovo are states separated
by distance on maps, time, language, religion, ethnicity, and modernity, to mention only a
few areas. These countries do not share common ancestry, or heritage, or culture. And
yet, they all have a common bond, one that goes beyond the U.N. peacekeepers who have
set foot on their soil – they are all entitled to self-determination under the laws and ethical
mores of the U.N. This entitlement did not cease to exist when colonial governments
were broken up, and it is no way limited to self-determination from European or Western
powers only.
The states selected as case studies for this article were chosen because they
represent different points on the road toward the creation of a nation-state that gives its
citizens legal and cultural ownership of the state such that they become part of the state’s
nationalism construct. These states are also illustrations of the unique ability of U.N.
peacekeeping missions to hinder the creation of a viable nation-state.
The Lebanese experience with UNIFIL demonstrates that, good intentions and
requests of some parties involved aside, there comes a time when the presence of U.N.
peacekeepers who cannot even stop violence in the area to which they are deployed
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serves only to preserve domestic strife and cleavages, thus creating a disconnect between
existing laws and norms which would allow full integration if left alone.
The Congolese experience with UNONUC and UNMONUC questions whether
U.N. peacekeeping missions do legitimately preserve nation-states, and concludes that,
contrary to mandates and mission statements, U.N. peacekeepers and their missions can
easily become agents of cohesion for a nation-state so lacking in cohesion that it is
neither a “nation” nor a “state.”
The Kosovo experience with UNMIK is designed to illustrate the dangers that
U.N. peacekeeping exhibits when it crosses the bounds of any form of peacekeeping that
could have been envisioned at the time the U.N. Charter was enacted, or the first
peacekeeping missions created, to become itself an agent of colonization under the guise
of humanitarian benevolence and acquired knowledge.
Taken individually, these case studies offer lessons and insights into the nature of
nation-states, nationalism, and the role of an outside peacekeeping force in both. As a
whole, this article demonstrates that, regardless of the justification for intervention, U.N.
peacekeeping operations devolve into exercises which threaten the ability of people in an
affected area to exercise their U.N.-given legal and moral rights to self- determination.
This article also demonstrates that when peacekeepers tarry too long in an area or attempt
to keep a state lacking the “nation” and the “state” duality required for a viable nationstate together they can work to upset international peace and security – in the present, as
in Lebanon, or in the future, as with UNONUC in the Congo, which voids the legal basis
for the creation of peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the U.N. Conflict and
violence are not palatable concepts in a society driven largely by humanitarian ideals and
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constructs; however, forcing groups of people to live together unwillingly because
diplomats and peacekeepers can salvage a constructed state, or because an international
body deems itself a proper source of law and government for these peoples, is as violative
of the humanitarian right of self-determination to create a nation-state and a sense of
nationalism as is arming the combatant groups or allowing them to go their separate
ways.
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